Introduction
A Virginia circuit court, in Agah v. Nazhandali, treated a mehr provision in an Iranian marriage certificate as an enforceable marital contract, ultimately ordering the husband to apay the wife the value of 114 gold coins. The husband argued on appeal that no reasonable court would have found that a contract existed at all, but on July 28, 2026, the Court of Appeals of Virginia declined to even consider his argument, because the husband himself had been referring to the marital agreement as a contract throughout his original trial where his objection had been that the contract did not apply, not that it did not exist at all. For practitioners, this unpublished decision provides a rare look at a court enforcing a mehr obligation, and additionally illustrates how little patience an appellate court has for an argument that contradicts the position that a party took in court below.
Facts of the Case
Masoud Agah (husband) and Leyla Nazhandali (wife) were married in April 1997, in Tehran, Iran. A marriage certificate was registered the following year. The parties separated in January of 2023, and Masoud filed for a divorce two months later. The marriage certificate that the couple had signed contained a mehr provision. As the court explained, when borrowing an out-of-state decision cited only for its articulation of the term, a mehr is a personal obligation running from the groom to the bride, which consists of anything of economic value, and is payable to the wife on demand at any time following the marriage. The mehr thus functions both as a disincentive for a husband to divorce his wife without cause under Islamic law, as well as a measure of financial security for the wife in the event of divorce or her husband’s death. The mehr provision in this case entitled the wife to a copy of the Quran, a mirror, candlesticks, 114 gold coins, and the cost of a pilgrimage.
When the hearing to distribute marital property occurred, Leyla sought the monetary equivalent of these coins, and described that obligation as a contract that Masoud had confirmed. He agreed with her that the document was a contract, but he objected to the circuit court enforcing the mehr provision that was within it. Because the mehr is rooted in an Islamic tradition that other religions do not share, and in light of the separation of church and state, he argued that the circuit court was barred from enforcing it. In addition, he noted that if the mehr was to be considered part of a legally binding contract, it should be considered as a post-marital agreement. If the court was to enforce it, the mehr obligation itself should be treated as marital property and divided equally between the two of them. The trial court held that it did have the authority to enforce the marital contract and ordered a payment of the 114 gold coins, ultimately awarding Leyla $11,304.02. Masoud appealed.
Legal Issue
The legal question in this case was whether the husband could argue, for the first time on appeal, that the marriage certificate he had repeatedly recognized and referred to in trial court, had never been a contract at all. This case also provides insight into a court’s treatment of a mehr provision, though the decision is unpublished and the merits of the mehr ruling were never reached on appeal.
Court Analysis
The court began with Rule 5A:18, which provides that no ruling of any trial court can serve as a basis for reversal unless a clear objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of its ruling. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that any objection alerts the trial court to the precise issue being raised (Fox v. Fox), as well as to give the trial court a fair opportunity to settle any issues as they arise (Creamer v. Commonwealth). Not just any objection will do, because the trial judge must understand the particular point being made in time to do something about it (Bethea v. Commonwealth).
Using these cases as a foundation for their analysis, the appellate court found Masoud’s new theory had no foundation in that record. He had not disputed the marital agreement’s existence at that first hearing, and he even referred to it multiple times throughout his testimony as a marriage contract he had signed at the time of marriage, and even shortened it to “the contract.” His original written objection was that the circuit court erred by applying Iranian law in part and Virginia law in part. However, in none of these original arguments did Masoud ever contend that the certificate was not binding or did not exist. The circuit court, in its own record, noted that both parties acknowledged the existence and binding nature of the contract, and neither of them objected to the court considering evidence of it, and that Masoud had argued only that the contract did not apply due to it being executed in Iran.
Because Masoud never objected to the agreement’s existence in the circuit court, the court had no opportunity to correct itself. Exceptions to Rule 5A:18 do exist, however Masoud never invoked any of them and the court declined to do so on his behalf, per Spanos v. Taylor.
Masoud continued to raise two other arguments that failed for similar reasons. First, he contended that, even if the marital certificate was to be considered a contract, its contents were not such that they met the requirements to be deemed an enforceable marital agreement. The issue with his argument here was the same: he had never made that argument below, where his position was instead that the mehr was a post-marital obligation. He then raised another objection to the court’s estimation of the monetary value attached to the coins, though failing to object to the court’s method of calculation at the time that it was proper to do so. He filed a motion to reconsider that raised the estimated value, but the record includes no ruling on this front. Per Westlake Legal Grp. v. Flynn, a motion to reconsider will not preserve an argument unless the record clearly establishes that the court had an opportunity to rule on it. The record here established no such opportunity. Ultimately, the rulings of the circuit court were affirmed in full.
Practical Implications
This case carries important implications for practitioners. The first lesson regards the theory selected at trial by a client. Masoud had several plausible objections to the enforcement of his contract. He chose to execute two of them, in part: that although the contract was valid, its religious character placed the mehr beyond what a civil court could enforce, and additionally, that the mehr obligation, being post-marital by nature, should be treated as marital property, and thus it should be divided equally. These positions were solid and understandable. But what Masoud could not do, is throw any objection into the mix hoping that one will work. Throughout the course of his case, he argued both that his contract did not apply, and on appeal that his contract did not ever actually exist. He argued that if the mehr were enforced, it should be divided as marital property, and he also argued that his contract did not meet the requirements necessary to be considered a marital agreement. Practitioners challenging the enforceability of marital agreements should remain consistent throughout their arguments, as any arguments that contradict prior ones will not be a helpful addition, even if they might have been originally. More to that point, each independent ground must be stated on the record at trial, even when one may appear stronger. A ground that has been omitted in a lower court is generally off limits for appeal, and a court will rarely revisit it. Additionally, a motion to reconsider any argument that was previously settled upon is mostly rejected unless the record shows that the court had a chance to rule on it.
Practitioners should also note the implications that this case may have on the enforceability of marriage contracts executed abroad. While this decision is unpublished and does not settle how Virginia handles mehr provisions, the circuit court did end up enforcing this one as a premarital contract, despite its origins in Iran. This ruling was left undisturbed by the appellate court.
Conclusion
Agah v. Nazhandali confirms the importance of cohesion throughout arguments in court. If a party argues a stance at trial, they should not then contradict that stance in an appeal. For practitioners, it is important to note the cruciality of consistency. Clients should not testify to the existence and enforceability of a contract, if they intend to later contend this. Preservation is not a matter that will be attended to after a ruling does not go a party’s way. Any objection should be fully framed when brought up originally, giving any court full opportunity to act properly on it. Though this decision is currently unpublished, it is also worth noting that the circuit court enforced an Iranian marriage contract containing a mehr provision, and the Court of Appeals did not disturb that holding. Whether a mehr is enforceable in Virginia remains an open question, however this case may offer a rare insight into how a provision like this may be handled.