- Introduction
In June of 2026, a Texas Court of Appeals decision, Deason v. D’Amato, reversed a post-divorce judgment for over $2.7 million after a wife attempted to relitigate ownership of jewelry she claimed had been gifted to her. This jewelry had been explicitly listed as the husband’s separate property in a prenuptial agreement, as well as in their Agreement Incident to Divorce (AID). The wife argued that a carve-out provision in the AID preserved her right to contest ownership of the jewelry after divorce. The court disagreed, stating that once a divorce agreement is incorporated into a final decree, it carries the finality of a court judgment, thus barring any post-divorce attempt to relitigate any property that has already been characterized in the decree. No carve-out in a marital agreement can change this. For practitioners, this case reveals the limits of what a carve-out can actually preserve, and what it cannot.
- Facts of the Case
Darwin Deason (husband) and Barbara D’Amato (wife) married on July 30, 2019. They signed a prenuptial agreement on their wedding day with the assistance of counsel for both parties. The marriage lasted less than three months. In October of 2019, Deason filed for divorce. Five pieces of jewelry, all purchased by Deason prior to their wedding and totaling nearly $1 million at the time of purchase, were listed individually as Deason’s separate property in their prenuptial agreement. The same listing was incorporated into the Agreement Incident to Divorce, which the family court approved and made part of the final decree. The AID included a carve-out provision that acknowledged D’Amato “may assert claims” regarding the jewelry, and other matters, “if necessary.” Two years after the divorce was finalized, D’Amato filed suit in district court, claiming that the jewelry was a gift and should be hers. The district court agreed, and awarded her $2.73 million for the value of the jewelry. Deason appealed, arguing that the carve-out was invalid and the jewelry should remain his separate property.
- Legal Issue
The legal issue in this case is whether res judicata barred D’Amato’s post-divorce claim to the jewelry. D’Amato argued that the carve out in the AID explicitly preserved her right to contest the ownership of this jewelry, and thus her original claim does not violate res judicata. Deason argued that the jewelry had been explicitly characterized as his separate property in both their prenuptial agreement and in the AID, and that regardless of any carve out, the jewelry should remain his.
- Court Analysis
The court began with Texas’s governing framework. Per Schwartz v. Schwartz, if a divorce agreement is incorporated into a final decree, it becomes a court judgment and holds as much finality as any court judgment. Once a decree explicitly designates property as separate and belonging to one party, the property can no longer be relitigated (Irick v. Lineberry). Referencing Tex. Fam. Code § 9.201, the court noted that it may not amend nor alter the division of any property that had been made in a divorce decree. Res judicata applies to final divorce decrees, per Baxter v. Ruddle. Because the jewelry had been listed in both the premarital agreement and the AID, it had definitively been disposed of, and, regardless of the carve-out clause that says otherwise, the re-trial of the jewelry’s ownership would be in violation of res judicata.
The court rejected the carve-out argument on two grounds. First, parties cannot make a contract that directly violates constitutional limitations and expect it to be enforced. The Texas Constitution, per Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15, prohibits a court from divesting a spouse of property that had been legally, properly designated as a party’s personal property. If the court was to side with D’Amato, they would be divesting the jewelry from Deason, and thus denying him of his Constitutional rights. Second, the carve-out language in the AID is supplemental, and does not directly undo the clauses that designated the jewelry as separate property. That characterization carried an effect, regardless of the carve-out.
- Practical Implications
Deason v. D’Amato serves as a reminder of the limitations of carve-out clauses in divorce agreements. A carve-out clause cannot undo a claim that has already been agreed upon. In this case, the carve-out clause did not override the designation of ownership that was already in both the premarital agreement and the AID. For practitioners drafting divorce agreements, this case shows the importance of internal consistency. If genuinely contested property is meant to be written into the agreement, it must not be contradictory to other clauses within the agreement. Any property that one party intends to contest should be removed from the other party’s separate property designation section, not just reserved for a catch-all carve-out clause.
More broadly, this case reinforces the finality that occurs when a divorce agreement is incorporated into a decree. Per Texas Constitutional law, once property is designated as separate in an agreement, that agreement becomes a judgment and thus res judicata applies, and no divesting of that property may occur. Even if the characterization was originally incorrect, a post-divorce suit may not contest it. The window to contest property closes when a decree becomes final.
- Conclusion
Deason v. D’Amato confirms that once a property is explicitly characterized in a divorce decree, res judicata bars any post-divorce attempt at relitigation. No carve-out can change this result. Practitioners should be mindful of the importance of consistency when drafting marital agreements and ensure their clients are aware that such finality occurs at the time of the decree.