A recent Supreme Judicial Court of Maine case, Hutchinson v. Gomez, reversed two district court rulings that had stripped a wife of her sole financial protection under a premarital agreement. The decision provides significant guidance on the construction of premarital agreements and the importance of language in legal contracts. This case hinges on how the interpretation of a single word: “intends,” can change the meaning of an entire prenuptial agreement and create unnecessary litigation for clients. The wife, Rosanna Gomez, had waived virtually every right that she had to any marital property. In return, she was only promised one thing: that her husband “intends” to purchase a condominium and that if they were to get divorced, she was entitled to half of its value. Her husband never bought the condominium. The trial court read the word “intends,” and dismissed Gomez’s claim. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a single word cannot be read in isolation and that the rest of the agreement tells an entirely different story. For practitioners, this case provides a cautionary tale with possible drafting consequences. Precatory language, such as “intends” (as well as “expects”, “plans”, etc.), carries legal weight on its own. While the Supreme Judicial Court ultimately reversed in Gomez’s favor, if the rest of the agreement had not contained definitive language that undermined the single use of “intends,” she likely would not have. Internal cross-references between clauses can be dispositive, and a divorce court’s jurisdiction can reach even further than just the marital estate. It can remedy a premarital agreement breach even when the underlying asset never materialized.
- Facts of the Case
On March 2, 2015, Robert Hutchinson and Rosanna Gomez, each represented by counsel, signed a premarital agreement eight days before their wedding. The agreement was largely one-sided. Hutchinson was to remain the sole owner of his personal business interests, both present and future, as well as any other assets he owned, to remain in his name. A mutual waiver of equitable distribution removed those assets from any marital property division under 19-A M.R.S. § 953. Given these terms, Gomez was to receive (in the event of divorce) virtually nothing of Hutchinson’s, with one key exception: a marital residence provision, titled “Marital Residence.” Essentially, this provision set out that Hutchinson would purchase a condominium in Portland, Maine, that was currently owned by his mother. Upon divorce, Gomez would receive one-half of the net value of the condo within sixty days. This provision opened with the key sentence of the case: Hutchinson “intends to purchase” the condominium. However, the sentences that followed contained unambiguous language, such as “will” and “shall.” Hutchinson never bought the condominium. His mother passed away in 2021, and the condo was included in her estate. Hutchinson filed for divorce on August 4, 2021. The Portland District Court ruled against Gomez on every significant issue: her breach-of-contract claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the business interests were deemed nonmarital property (per the prenuptial agreement), and she was awarded only $25,000 in attorney fees out of the $100,486.10 she had requested. Hutchinson was ordered to pay $125,000 toward equitable distribution. Gomez appealed.
- Issue
The central question of this case was the court’s interpretation of the marital residence provision, whether the word “intends” created a binding obligation or merely expressed an aspirational goal. Hutchinson argued that “intends” is not a promise. It expresses a plan, but not a commitment nor a promise. Because the purchase never happened, there was no breach. Without a condominium in the marital estate, the divorce court had nothing to divide and therefore had no jurisdiction to act on this matter at all.
Gomez countered that “intends” cannot be read in a vacuum. The mandatory language surrounding it pointed unmistakably to an obligation. More fundamentally, she explained that the obligation was the entire basis for her agreement to waive her marital property rights in the first place. Without it, she had given up everything, and received nothing.
- The Court’s Analysis
The court noted that premarital agreements are contracts, and, applying the standard principles of contract interpretation, cases of unambiguous language are reviewed de novo (Dow v. Billing). Against this backdrop, the court reasoned the following:
The court found that isolating the word “intends” was an error. The marital residence provision must not be read in isolation, but as a whole, in the context of its surroundings. After the opening clause, the provision used mandatory terms throughout, such as: the condominium “shall be titled from the date of purchase” in both names, and “Roby shall pay to Rosanna her one-half share” upon divorce. Further, the property retention clause’s carve-out, specifically mentioning an exception in its terms that is further explained in the marital residence provision, confirmed that this obligation was the entire consideration for Gomez’s waivers. This was not a suggestion nor a goal, but an expectation specifically articulated in the agreement, and the only thing Gomez received in exchange for giving up her marital property rights. Because Hutchinson never purchased the condominium, the district court was directed on remand to determine appropriate equitable relief.
- Practical Implications
This case illustrates the paramount importance of precise language in prenuptial agreements. The district court’s willingness to read “intends” as precatory, despite the mandatory language surrounding it, shows how the interpretation of a single word can create hefty litigation. The Supreme Judicial Court was direct on this point: the word “intends” in the opening clause could not override the mandatory language surrounding it. The surrounding language, riddled with obligatory and clear words (such as “will” and “shall”), provides a basis to read the word “intends” as an obligation, not a goal.
This decision also underscores the role of consideration. The court here not only relied on the literal interpretation of the word and the cross-reference to other sections, but it also relied on the underlying consideration for the agreement itself. The condominium obligation was the exchange for her sweeping waivers, and without it, the agreement would have left her with nothing.
- Conclusion
Hutchinson v. Gomez confirms that, while ambiguous contract language can create legal hurdles, no single word, read in isolation, can override clear intent reflected within an agreement’s broader structure. Gomez prevailed on the central issues: the husband’s failure to purchase the condominium did indeed breach the premarital agreement, and the divorce court has full authority to remedy that breach. The matter now returns to the district court to determine appropriate relief. The drafting consequences are direct. Use consistent, mandatory terms for every obligation, and be wary of the implications that cross-references can hold throughout the agreement. If aspirational language appears anywhere near a binding commitment, fix it before a court has to.