- Introduction
On June 9, 2026, a Washington Court of Appeals decision, In re Marriage of Roman, affirmed a trial court’s denial of a husband’s motion to vacate final dissolution orders entered after he failed to appear at trial. The husband attributed his absence to his attorney’s withrdrawal and a failure to properly notify him of key trial details, as well as personal struggles with mental health and housing instability. He filed a motion to vacate final dissolution orders after a year of non-engagement with the case, and was ultimately denied. The court reinforced the Washington rule that attorney negligence, without constituting near-total abandonment, does not justify vacating a judgment, and this case did not meet that bar for near-total abandonment. For practitioners, this case has implications regarding the scope of CR 60(b) when a party fails to appear in court, as well as the broad loss a party stands to suffer if they become disengaged in their own trial.
- Facts of the Case
Gregory appeared for a divorce hearing, through counsel, to submit a postnuptial agreement to the court that classified their marital home as his property (as it was purchased with money gifted to him by his family). Importantly, during this time, Gregory received notice of a trial date that was set for August 7, 2023. In June of 2023, Gregory’s attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw. The notice was sent to the marital home, however, Gregory had moved out of this home in October of 2022. The notice was also emailed to an address Gregory later claimed he had no access to. Additionally, his attorney’s notice failed to include the scheduled trial date. The following month, the court rescheduled the trial date to November of 2023, and sent the updated scheduling order to the same addresses (his outdated email address and a home he no longer lived in). Both notices reached only Quinby, and when trial began on November 6, 2023, Gregory was absent. Without Gregory present, the court heard unchallenged testimony, with no corroborating evidence, from Quinby. She claimed that Gregory was neglectful and even abusive. She also told the court that Gregory had promised her that he would not enforce the postnuptial agreement the two had signed. On the basis of that uncontested testimony, the court declined to enforce the postnuptial agreement, designated the home as community property, and awarded it to Quinby. Gregory’s visitation rights with his two children were restricted to supervised visitation every other weekend. Exactly one year after the trial, Gregory appeared, accompanied by new counsel. He filed a motion to vacate pursuant to CR 60(b)(1) and CR 60(b)(11). The trial court denied his motion, and he appealed.
- Legal Issue
Gregory presented two issues in his appeal. First, whether the inaccurate contact information in his previous counsel’s withdrawal notice constituted sufficient irregularity to obtain relief under CR 60(b)(1). Second, under the same rule, whether Gregory’s struggle with mental health and housing instability could excuse his failure to appear. Underlying both issues was a broader question of how much a party can attribute to his attorney’s failures when his own actions were less than engaged.
- Court Analysis
On Gregory’s claim of irregularity regarding his previous counsel, the court reaffirmed that, under CR 60(b)(1), counsel must be “not operating as [the client’s] agent in any meaningful sense of the word’’(In re Marriage of Olsen). Mere negligence does not meet this standard. Because Gregory did not deny receiving initial notice of a trial date while still being represented by counsel, he was responsible for tracking his own case. Given his knowledge that a trial would exist, even if he did not have proper information about its rescheduling date, he had an obligation to contact his own counsel or reach out to the courthouse. For an entire year, he did nothing. Regarding Gregory’s claim of mental and physical challenges, Gregory invoked In re Marriage of Gharst, in which a court reversed a denial of relief under CR 60(b) for a wife who was not physically able to appear at her trial proceedings due to a serious stroke that caused severe cognitive impairment and paralysis. However, the court found key differences in Gregory’s case when comparing it to Gharst. In Gharst, her trial court did not consider her health challenges, initially, as a basis of relief. In Gregory’s case, his mental and physical health challenges (health issues and housing instability, mainly), were considered and subsequently rejected. Additionally, the challenges that Gregory was facing, while real difficulties, did not rise to the same level of impairment that Gharst was facing. Gregory and his new counsel also challenged the property distribution ruling, but that challenge was not reviewed, as the appellate brief contained no legal citations or legal analysis of any kind.
- Practical Implications
This case provides a clear illustration of the line between attorney negligence and attorney abandonment, and when this bar of abandonment is not met, where the responsibility lies. An attorney who withdraws using incorrect contact information may be negligent, but in the state of Washington, it is not considered abandonment, especially if the client had prior knowledge of a trial and made no independent effort to follow up on his own proceedings. Practitioners, if withdrawing, should advise their clients that their absence in the trial will be detrimental to their case, and that the withdrawal of counsel will not suspend or stop court proceedings. While counsel has a responsibility to help their clients, a client’s engagement in their own case is paramount to their success. The severe consequences that Gregory faced were directly due to his absence in court. Even with a legally sound postnuptial agreement, lack of engagement in trial can disrupt more than just arguable details. Gregory lost his home (which was, per the postnuptial agreement, designated as his) and access to his children (beyond occasional supervised visitations). It is crucial to advise clients of the importance of their engagement in their trial.
- Conclusion
In re Marriage of Roman confirms the high bar set for attorney abandonment, as well as the narrow scope of relief available under CR 60(b). The consequences in this case were significant, and due almost exclusively to Gregory’s inability to appear in trial and lack of engagement. The implications that should be taken from this case are straightforward: advise clients that the withdrawal of representation does not pause the case, and that they bear a responsibility to stay engaged in their trial, regardless of their attorney’s presence.